Engineers are working hard to create products and processes for the benefit of mankind. They also improve the comfort in our daily lives and beautify our environment. These are the people, the technological fantasies into reality.
But while engineers are to reduce the risks from the use of new technologies that are not always successfully engaged. Very often there are no technical obstacles to overcome not, but the barriers with other people.
Large engineering projects in the aerospace industry are generally very expensive and sensitive. Correcting a design error can be a time-consuming and costly. Looking at the economic costs are not always the redesign. To better evaluate dilemmas faced by engineers when they are faced with discussing design flaws we, two known cases. The first case is the involvement of the space shuttle Challenger and the second case, the DC-10 jumbo jet.
The case of the Space Shuttle Challenger
To better appreciate this case the context is useful.
The main tool is the Space Shuttle. There are three engines of the ship, which also has a huge cargo space to start laboratory and satellite from the Space Shuttle. Most of the liquid hydrogen fuel rocket engines must be stored in a huge external tank (which also leads to the rapid combustion of oxygen). The external tank is discarded after eight and a half minutes from take-off when fuel runs out.
The rocket is not enough energy to send the shuttle into space, because of the enormous weight. The extra boost at the start is provided by two external solid-fuel engines. Since boosters are huge and long term that are made of 5 segments and segments are connected to the grid. These compounds are used as meetings in the field and the collection of the grid.
Field joints are not as strong as that of plants and the seal is not as reliable. The poor performance of these boards results from the field tests. Of particular concern is that the seal in hot air escapes from the rocket to prevent at low temperatures. However, the redesign process is slow and not the new design was available.
The night before the Challenger Space Shuttle launch, by 28 January 1986, were concerned about Morton Thiokol, the manufacturer of solid-fuel rockets, missiles that could cause problems because of the cold. He held a teleconference with NASA administrators to present their concerns and to recommend that the launch was postponed until the temperature rose to a more appropriate level.
NASA officials rejected the recommendation that the missiles would be able to function well, even at the lowest temperature of 26 degrees Fahrenheit, in the design requires a yield as low as 31 degrees Fahrenheit. Under pressure from the manager of NASA, Morton Thiokol managers changed their recommendation to proceed with the execution, despite the protests of the engineers could not prove conclusively that cohabitation has become defective.
The DC-10 jumbo jet at
In 1974, the first fully loaded DC-10 jumbo in the suburbs of Paris exploded, killing 346 people, a record at the time of an accident involving a single aircraft. This was an accident occur, as it is known by the designers of the aircraft design was defective was because the door of the container could explode during flight.
The body of the subcontract McDonnell Douglas DC-10 jumbo for Convair. Applegate, Dan worked as an engineer at Convair management of the project. Dan wrote a letter to the Vice President of the Convair on the various hazards that could result from the construction of the hull to see. He highlighted some potential danger, especially regarding the possibility of a disaster by the absence of the tailgate. He explained how the door of the container could break during the flight to a decompression of the cargo hold, what the collapse of the floor above the passenger cabin. If this happens, the damage control lines along the cabin floor and the aircraft could not be controlled.
The engineer recommended that the doors have been developed in conjunction with the strengthening of the cabin floor. He warned that such changes recommended that some doors closed to cargo DC-10 in an air accident and the aircraft was to remain.
While the top management of the Convair not with the analysis technique or warning Applegate disagree, arguing that Convair could face liability if this information with McDonnell Douglas share. These liabilities can be severe, because the cost of necessary renovations and improvements to the security of the delay would be very high and can occur at a time when McDonnell Douglas was a competitive disadvantage.
Comments:
There is a close parallel between the two cases. Both designs were known to be defective by the engineers who tried alarm management, but management decisions are clouded by monetary considerations for the possible loss of jobs and led the life of inmates. In both cases, hats and caps were from engineering management to carry away.
